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I. 
Since the 1982 debt crisis, Mexico has extensively restructured its economy, including 
rapidly liberalizing its trade and closely integrating with the rest of North America. Exports 
of manufactures have grown dramatically and the Mexican economy has become much more 
export-oriented (Table 1). Growth of the economy however has been erratic: average annual 
growth of GDP per capita has in fact been negative since 1981. 
Severe economic contraction characterized the Mexican economy during the early 
1980s. The withdrawal of external credits and capital flight led to a net outflow of resources 
of 6 percent of GDP in the wake of the 1982 crisis. The Mexican government responded with 
strict policies of stabilization and maintained close compliance with the macroeconomic 
targets set by the international financial institutions with respect to inflation, budget deficits, 
trade deficits and debt repayments. 
In 1985, Mexico began to shift from stabilization to structural adjustment and rapidly 
restructured its economy and liberalized its trade. In June of 1985, over 92 percent of 
imports were covered by import licenses, but by December of the same year this percentage 
had been reduced to 47 percent. The process of liberalization accelerated when Mexico 
joined GATT in the summer of 1986. By 1988 official reference prices for trade were 
eliminated and the trade-weighted average of import tariffs was reduced to 24.5 percent. By 
1990 Mexico's economy had become one of the most open among developing countries: only 
about 8 percent of imports were still covered by import licenses and the average trade- 
weighted tariff rate had been reduced to only 12 percent. 
Liberalization had little success, however, in stimulating economic growth. Economic 
stagnation still plagued Mexico in the late 1980s. Several shocks contributed to the problem, 
i.e. the 1985 earthquake in Mexico City, the collapse of oil prices in 1986 and the world-wide 
stock market crisis of 1987. While the average growth of GDP per capita during 1981-1985 
was a negative 0.33 percent, during 1986-1993 it was a negative 0.45 peercent. The average 
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annual rate of gross domestic investment was a negative 2 percent during the whole period 
of 1980-1990 and continued to decline thereafter (Inter-American Development 1996). 
With the negotiation of an agreement with its international creditors under the Brady 
Plan in 1989, Mexico began to regain the confidence of international financial markets and 
its economy began to show signs of recovery. Stabilization of the exchange rate and high 
interest rates attracted large inflows of foreign capital. Inflation was substantially reduced on 
the basis of reducing the government deficit, negotiating wage-price controls and maintaining 
exchange-rate stability. While the inflation rate--based on the consumer price index--was 132 
percent in 1987, by 1992 it was 15.5 percent and by 1994 only 6.9 percent. Whereas the 
government deficit was over 14 percent of GDP in 1987, this had been converted to a surplus 
of 4.5% percent of GDP in 1992 (Inter-American Development Bank 1996). 
Growth was propped up by Mexico's signing of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement at the end of 1993 and by expenditures during the 1994 presidential elections. 
In 1994, real GDP per capita continued to grow by 1.6 percent. However, gross domestic 
investment continued to decline, dropping 1 percent a year during the period 1990-1995. 
Expansion of the economy was also threatened by growing overvaluation of the exchange 
rate and an increasing current account deficit. In 1987, the current account showed a surplus 
of 4.3 million dollars, but by 1994 it showed a deficit of 28.8 million dollars. 
Large capital inflows had been financing the current account deficit. In 1992 the 
capital account had a surplus of 27 million dollars, and in 1993 a surplus of 33.8 millions 
dollars, but in 1994 this was reduced to only 12.7 million. But much of the capital flowing 
into the country was short-term portfolio investment. This helps explain why gross domestic 
investment continued to decline throughout this period. In 1989, portfolio investment had 
constituted only 10 percent of all capital inflows, but by 1993 this percentage had risen to 87 
percent. 
By December of 1994, Mexico's external accounts were no longer sustainable: the 
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government had to substantially devalue the peso and speculative capital took flight. The 
Mexican economy plunged into a severe recession in 1995, real GDP per capita contracting 
by an estimated 8.7 percent (Inter-American Development Bank 1996). 
Benefits and Costs 
Debate continues on who has benefitted from Mexico's economic restructuring, and 
who has been harmed. In this paper, we provide a partial answer to this question by 
examining the distribution of the components of total household per capita income and in 
particular the distribution of monetaiy income received by various positions and occupations 
in the Mexican labor force. Our period of analysis spans the period 1984-1994, based on the 
availability of information from income-expenditure surveys. We focus on the distribution 
of both labor income and employee income because of the surprisingly large impact that they 
have had on the distribution of total household per capita income. 
Employment and wages as a whole have suffered since 1980 (Table 1). 
Manufacturing employment has contracted by about one-quarter. As a result, the share of 
informal-sector workers in total employment has increased to over one-third. Real wages 
have dropped sharply, and the share of wages in total manufacturing value added has 
plummeted. Blue-collar wages in manufacturing in 1994 were only 72% of their 1980 level. 
White-collar workers in manufacturing did relatively better: while their salaries dropped by 
about a quarter from 1980 to 1989, they recovered to be 6% higher than their 1980 level by 
1994. Consequently, the disparity in labor-income levels between skilled and unskilled 
workers widened substantially after 1989. 
Inequality 
Income inequality progressively worsened in Mexico from 1984 to 1994. As reported 
by Mexico's National Institute of Statistics, the Gini coefficient of total household income-- 
with households grouped by deciles and ranked by total household income--increased from 
0.429 in 1984 to 0.477 in 1994 (Table 2). The increase in inequality was substantial from 
4 
1984 to 1989, and afterwards more moderate. Inequality of labor income followed a different 
pattern: first decreasing from 1984 to 1989 and then increasing sharply from 1989 to 19942. 
In this paper, we focus on the changes in income inequality during the period 1989- 
1994, when the intensification of inequality and polarization of labor income first manifested 
themselves3. The difference between our results and INEGI's is that we report on 1) the per 
capita income of households and on 2) individual observations, not grouped data. 
For 1989, the sample size of the income-expenditure survey is 11,531 households and 
56,999 individuals, for 1992 10,530 households and 50,862 individuals, and for 1994 12,815 
households and 60,353 individuals. Our results are based on combining all individuals and 
their income with their respective households and household income. Most studies are at a 
disadvantage in this respect since they can only examine the income and characteristics of the 
household head, which are normally included as part of household-level data. 
Our results show that the Gini coefficient of total household per capita income 
increased from 0.5 12 in 1989 to 0.5 19 in 1992 and then to 0.524 in 1994--a modest though 
significant rise in such a short period of time (Table 3). This followed on the heels of a 
dramatic rise in inequality from 1984 to 1989 (Alarcon and McKinley (forthcoming (a)) and 
2 Labor income includes wages and salaries, piece-rate compensation, bonuses and tips, 
vacation pay and profit shares. This is still a restricted definition of labor income since it does 
not include income from self-employment, much of which is attributable to labor. One option 
would be to assume that all income from self-employment is labor income and to determine 
whether this assumption alters our results, but this is a project for another paper. 
Mexico is unusual among Latin American countries in having fairly comprehensive and 
reliable income-expenditure surveys for the last 10 years. They were conducted by the 
National Institute of Statistics (INEGI) and cover the years 1984, 1989, 1992, and 1994. All 
four surveys have the same conceptual framework, structure of the questionnaire, time period 
in which the data were collected, and procedures for sampling and data collection. For a 
discussion of issues of comparability among the four surveys, refer to the Documento 
Metodologico for each survey. Although there was an income-expenditure survey for 1977, 
differences in the methodology and sampling techniques prevent any direct comparison with 
subsequent surveys. 
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Alarcon and McKinley (forthcoming (b)). Table 4 shows the change in real total household 
per capita income by decile from 1989 to 1994. While the income richest two deciles 
increased by about 8.5% to 9% during this period, the income of the poorest decile increased 
by only 1.4% and that of the second-poorest decile actually declined slightly. With a couple 
of exceptions, the general pattern shows that the richer the decile, the more its income rose. 
The sharpest contrasts in trends in real income were in rural areas: while the real income of 
the poorest rural decile increased by a mere 0.6%, that of the richest rose by a robust 20%. 
One of the driving forces of the rise in total inequality during the period 1989-1994 
was the increased inequality in the distribution of labor income: while the share of total 
income attributable to labor income increased slightly, its pseudo-Gini coefficient rose sharply 
from 0.485 in 1989 to 0.511 in 1992 and then to 0.530 in In 1994, the pseudo-Gini 
coefficient of labor income exceeded that of total household income. 
The other component that contributed significantly to rising inequality in the 
distribution of total household per capita income was non-monetaiy income: while its relative 
distribution changed little, its share of total income rose by over 4 percentage points. The 
major sub-component of non-monetary income was the imputed rental value of owner- 
occupied housing--accounting, for example, for 61% of all non-monetary income in 1994. 
From 1989 to 1994, the share of imputed rental value rose by 19%. But this was matched 
by the same percentage rise in the share of all other non-monetary income. 
Income from services, agricultural income and transfers contributed only marginally 
to changes in the distribution of total household per capita income from 1989 to 1994--the 
former accounting for a slight increase in inequality and the latter two for a slight decrease. 
A pseduo-Gini coefficient for an income component is derived by ranking each component 
of income--such as labor income--by total household per capita income, not by the value of 
the component itself If the latter procedure were followed, the result would be the 
component's standard Gini coefficient. 
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The share of transfers dropped and it also became more equally distributed. The share of 
agricultural income dropped noj.ably, i.e. from 5% to 4%--most of it accounted for by the 
30% decline in farming income. The decline in farming income was concentrated among the 
self-employed and rural peons, who together experienced a drop of 40%. By contrast, the 
farming income of owners of small and large farms rose by 25%. While total income from 
livestock declined by 7%, this was due primarily to a 11% drop among the self-employed and 
rural peons. This drop was counteracted to some extent by a 49% rise in income among 
owners of small and large ranches. These differential effects help explain why the inequality 
of rural household per capita income rose more than that of urban household per capita 
income during this period. 
Paradoxically, the component that contributed the most to decreasing income 
inequality from 1989 to 1994 was profits. This component's share of total household income 
nose-dived from 13.6% to 9.1%, and also became more equally distributed. From 1989 to 
1994, while the Gini coefficient of total household per capita income rose by about 0.012 
(from 0.5 12 to 0.524), the changes in the share and distribution of profits served to decrease 
the Gini coefficient by about 0.031. What mainly determined the overall rise in the Gini 
coefficient was the disequalizing contribution of non-monetary income (accounting for a rise 
of 0.021) and labor income (accounting for a rise of 0.028). 
Commercial profits dominated all other categories of profits in Mexico during 1989- 
1994--accounting, for example, for 57% of all profit income in 1994. But its share declined 
by 27%. The share of commercial profits received by owners of small and large enterprises 
dipped by 8%, but the biggest drop in share, i.e. 31%, was among the non-agricultural self- 
employed. Although a smaller proportion of all profits, industrial profits declined more than 
commercial profits, i.e. by 39%. This was mainly due to the 57% decline in industrial profits 
among owners of small and large enterprises. By contrast, the share of industrial profits 
received by the non-agricultural self-employed rose by 8%. 
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Polarization of Labor Income 
In this paper, we focus on the increasing inequality in the distribution of labor income. 
But interestingly, labor income also became more polarized during this period. As inequality 
increases, polarization often increases correspondingly, but the two do not always move in 
the same direction (Foster and Wolfson 1992). Polarization encompasses two concepts: 
"increased spread" and "increased bipolarity". "Increased spread" denotes an unambiguous 
movement away from the middle of a distribution; this would occur when the rich are getting 
richer and the poor are getting poorer and the gap between the two poles of rich and poor is 
widening. "Increased bipolarity" denotes that the distribution around each of the two poles 
is becoming more bunched or tighter. This would imply that those closer to the middle of the 
distribution move away from it (and towards their respective pole) while those farther away 
(because they are beyond the pole) move towards the pole and thus closer to the middle of 
the distribution. Inequality and polarization would move together when a regressive transfer 
takes place across the middle of the distribution (i.e. an increased spread), but would move 
in opposite directions when a pair of progressive transfers takes place on each side of the 
middle (i.e. an increased bipolarity). 
From 1989 to 1994, the degree of polarization of the distribution of labor income 
increased more than the degree of inequality. Table 5 shows that during this period the 
polarization index increased by 26%--from 1.28 to 1.61--while the standard Gini coefflient 
increased by 12%--from 0.495 in 1989 to 0.524 in 1992 and then to The increase in 
the standard Gini coefficient was quite large in itself for such a short period of time. As we 
shall see later in this paper, this increased inequality of labor income helps to explain why it 
contributed so decisively to greater inequality in the distribution of total household per capita 
These standard Gini coefficients differ from the pseudo—Gini coefficients 
reported in Table 3 because in this case labor income is ranked by itself 
instead of by total household per capita income, as would be the case with 
the pseudo—Gini coefficient. 
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income. 
The formula for the polarization index (P) includes three major components, the Gini 
coefficient itself(G), skewness (S) and the "relative median deviation" (T), where P = (T - 
G)S. Skewness is the mean divided by the median. The relative median deviation is derived 
by dividing the mean of the population above the median by the mean of the population below 
the median and then dividing this ratio by the overall mean of the distribution. This gives a 
measure of the 'spread' or dispersion around the middle of the distribution. As the table 
shows, polarization increased more than inequality during this period because skewness rose 
by 18% and the relative mean deviation by 9%. In other words, there was an increased 
spread.away from the middle of the distribution of labor income. 
II. DECOMPOSDiG TOTAL INCOME BY POSITION 
In order to thrther detail and clarify the changes in the distribution of total household 
per capita income, we use the classifications available in the Mexican income-expenditure 
surveys to categorize members of the labor force according to economic position. We 
concentrate on the receipt of monetary income by individual household members, which 
constituted 78% of total income in 1989, 73% in 1992 and 74% in 1994 (Table 3). 
Positions in the Labor Force 
The surveys classify members of the labor force into various positions based on their 
relationship to the means of production. These positions are non-agricultural employees, 
rural dayworkers and peons, small or large employers (depending on whether they employ six 
or more workers), the self-employed, and unpaid workers in household or non-household 
enterprises. For the purposes of analysis, we divide non-agricultural employees into two 
categories, higher-paid employees and basic workers. Higher-paid employees are an elite 
group consisting of professionals, technical workers, functionaries and directors, supervisors, 
managers, and operators of moving or transportation equipment. Basic workers are all 
others. We also divide the self-employed into agricultural and non-agricultural. 
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According to our classifications, the composition of the Mexican labor force became 
more polarized over this period. The large middle-income group of basic workers declined 
significantly as a share of the total Mexican labor force, while those in very low-income 
positions--rural dayworkers and peons, the agricultural self-employed and unpaid workers-- 
grew. The share of owners of small and large enterprises taken together rose sharply from 
1989 to 1992 and then declined from 1992 to 1994; but overall their combined share rose by 
about 40% (Table 6A)6. The share of the non-agricultural self-employed increased slightly, 
while that of higher-paid employees stayed basically the same. However, the relative average 
income level of higher-paid employees was the only one to rise from 1989 to 1994 (relative 
to that of rural peons, our reference group for comparison). Even though both the 
agricultural and non-agricultural self-employed grew as a share of the labor force, their 
relative income levels dropped of the agricultural self-employed below the 
level of rural peons. 
It is significant that the share of unpaid workers in household and non-household 
enterprises rose substantially from 1989 to 1994--from a little under 8% to over 11%. This 
underscores the fact that during this period many Mexican workers were driven into the 
informal sector and into work without cash remuneration. In 1994, the average cash income 
level of unpaid workers was only one-tenth that of rural dayworkers and peons. 
Consequently, despite their significant share of the labor force, they accounted for a mere 
0.4% of total income. As a result, this group does not figure prominantly in subsequent 
estimates of income distribution in this paper. 
As a result of the above trends, the share of total income received by higher-paid 
6 These results are likely to be subject to sampling error because of 
the small number of owners of small and large enterprises. The results 
for the owners of large enterprises are especially prone to this 
problem. The instability of the results over the three years for these 
two groups lends weight to this interpretation, and thus our findings 
should be treated with some degree of caution. 
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employees rose significantly, while that of basic workers, the non-agricultural self-employed 
and the agricultural self-employed dropped (Table 6B). These results were due to differing 
combinations of employment and income-level effects. 
The income share of higher-paid employees rose from roughly 14% to over 19%, 
predominantly because of their sharply rising income levels. 
Dropping correspondingly was the income share of basic workers--from roughly 32% 
to 26.6%--due almost exclusively to their abruptly declining share of the labor force. 
The income share of the agricultural self-employed dropped progressively from 4.6% 
to 3.2%, despite the rise in their labor force share. 
The income share of the non-agricultural self-employed also dropped notably--from 
10.6% to 8.7%--despite the rise in their labor force share. 
ifi. THE CONTRIBUTION TO INEQUALITY BY POSITIONS 
Introduction 
The Gini coefficient of total household per capita income can be decomposed into the 
contribution of components based on three factors: each component's share of total income, 
its own Gini coefficient, and the correlation of its distribution with the distribution of total 
income. We designate the last factor the "Gini correlation", which is a ratio of two 
covariances, i.e. 1) the covariance of income component k and the cumulative distribution of 
total income divided by 2) the covariance of income component k and the cumulative 
distribution of component k itself (Lerman and Yitzhaki 1985 and Yitzhaki 1983) (for 
applications see Adams and Alderman 1992; Adams and He 1995; Karoly and Burtless 1995; 
and Stark et al. 1986). 
Given each component's share of total income (Sk), the higher its own Gini coefficient 
(Gk) or its Gini correlation (Rk), the greater its "contribution to inequality" Q /G). 
fact, the percentage change in the Gini coefficient of total per capita income (G) attributable 
to a one per cent change in income component k is (SkGk.R1JG) - Sk. If the first term, the 
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component's contribution to total inequality, exceeds the second term, which is its share of 
total income, a marginal increase in that component will augment inequality. If the second 
term exceeds the first, a marginal increase will lower inequality (Leibrandt, Woolard and 
Woolard 1996). 
Gross Contribution to Inequality by Position 
First, we examine each position's gross contribution to inequality in 1989 and the 
change in this contribution from 1989 to 1994. In 1989, basic workers accounted for over 
26% of the total inequality in the distribution of household income per capita, while higher- 
paid employees accounted for about 18% (Table 7A). The principal reason for the large share 
of inequality attributable to basic workers was their 32% share of all income. However, in 
1994, this group's income share dropped to 26.6% and their share of inequality to 21.4%. 
Meanwhile, the share of total income received by higher-paid employees had risen from about 
14% to over 19% and because the distribution of their share of income had become more 
unequal, their share of total inequality became the largest of any group, i.e. over 28%. 
The share of inequality attributable to owners of small enterprises dropped somewhat 
from 1992 to 1994--after having risen appreciably from 1989 to 1992. Over the whole 
period, however, their share of inequality rose from 7.3% to 8%. By contrast, the share of 
inequality attributable to owners of large enterprises declined from 5% to 3.4%. 
The share of inequality accounted for by both the agricultural and non-agricultural 
self-employed also declined over the period 1989 to 1994. Already a small 1.4% in 1989, the 
contribution to inequality of the agricultural self-employed dropped by over half to 0.6% in 
1994. There was a dramatic and consequential drop in the contribution of the non- 
agricultural self-employed from over 11% in 1989 to 7.7% in 1994. 
The only group to make a 'negative' contribution to inequality was rural dayworkers 
and peons: they contributed directly to lowering total inequality by almost 1% in 1989-- 
compared to only 0.5% in 1994. 
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Marginal Contribution to Inequality by Position 
The marginal contribution by each position to inequality is equal to its share of total 
inequality minus its share of total income. In 1994, only in the case of three positions would 
increasing their income at the margin have augmented inequality (Table 7B). These three 
were higher-paid employees and owners of small and large enterprises. Increasing the income 
of owners of small enterprises by 1% would have augmented inequality by 2.3%, whereas for 
owners of large firms, the increase in inequality would have been only 1.5%. For owners of 
large enterprises, this marginal effect was significantly lower than it was in 1989, and only 
about half of its effect in 1992. For higher-paid employees, the effect in 1994 would have 
been dramatic, i.e. a 9% rise in inequality--substantially above the marginal effect of only 
3.8% in 1989, and even of 6.9% in 1992. 
By 1994, higher-paid employees emerged as the largest contributors, by far, to 
inequality in both gross and marginal terms. 
In that same year, the second-biggest gross contributor to inequality was basic 
workers, but if their income had been increased by 1%, they would in fact have made the 
greatest contribution to lowering inequality--namely, by 5.2%. In other words, their share 
of total income significantly exceeded their percentage contribution to inequality. This 
group's marginal effect was the same in both 1989 and 1992. 
Increasing the income of rural peons and both the agricultural and non-agricultural 
self-employed would also have served to lower inequality in 1994, but by a lesser extent than 
for basic workers. For rural peons, the marginal effect would have been a negative 3.5% and 
for the agricultural self-employed a negative 2.6%. For the latter group, the marginal effect 
would have been more equalizing in 1989 and 1992. By contrast, the effect of increasing the 
income of the non-agricultural self-employed would have been slightly disequalizing in 1989, 
i.e. increasing inequality by 0.7% at the margin, whereas by 1994 the effect would have been 
equalizing, i.e. lowering inequality by 1%. This underscores the fact that while the number 
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of the non-agricultural self-employed grew relative to other groups, their relative income level 
dropped significantly. 
IV. THE CONTRIBUTION TO INEQUALITY BY EMPLOYEE OCCUPATION 
Decomposing Income by Employee Occupation 
Since employees--especially higher-paid employees--account for such a large share 
of total inequality, we decompose this broad classification of positions into eight occupational 
categories in order to more precisely identify the sources of inequality. Among our category 
of higher-paid employees, we distinguish technical workers from supervisory and professional 
employees. Among our category of basic workers, we distinguish six occupations: public 
worker.s, industrial workers, industrial laborers and helpers, commercial employees, service 
workers, and the combined group of low-paid employed street vendors and domestic 
workers. 
For these various categories of employees for the period 1989-1994, Tables 8A and 
8B show the changes in their share of the employee workforce and their share of total 
employee income. Both technical workers and supervisory and professional employees 
increased their share of total employees. While the income level of technical workers edged 
up, supervisors and professionals experienced a more dramatic increase, i.e. from 5.6 times 
to 8.4 times the level of income of peons (our continuing reference group). As a 
consequence, the share of total employee income received by supervisory and professional 
employees ballooned from a little over 18% to 29%, while that of technical workers rose by 
only a little over 1 percentage point (Table 8B). 
The experience of public workers was in stark contrast: they experienced a 
precipitous drop in their share of the employee workforce from 25% to about 17%. Those 
who were not laid off tended to be higher-paid public workers—as indicated by the rise in their 
relative income level. Overall, public workers lost over seven percentage points in their share 
of total employee income. 
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Industrial workers experienced a decline similar to that of public workers. While their 
income level remained stable, their share of the employee workforce dropped by five 
percentage points, from about 24% to about I 9%--most of the decline occurring from 1992 
to 1994. As a consequence, their share of employee income plummeted by about six 
percentage points. While the proportion of regular industrial employees was decreasing, that 
of industrial laborers was shooting up from 7% to over 13%. This drove down the average 
level of labor income in industry since by 1994 the income level of industrial laborers was only 
two-thirds that of regular industrial workers; in 1989, laborers' relative income level was 
already low, but declined by an additional one-eighth by 1994. 
The changing composition of the workforce in industry illustrates that employee 
income in general shifted to lower-skilled, lower-paid occupations. As another example, 
while the income share of regular service workers dropped, that of street vendors and 
domestic workers rose. In both cases, their relative income levels remained unchanged from 
1989 to 1994. The income level of vendors and domestic workers remained about 60% that 
of regular service workers. While service workers' share of the employee workforce edged 
up, that of vendors and domestic workers rose by three percentage points to approximately 
equal that of service workers. 
Like other occupations in the middle-income range, commerical employees lost 
ground relative to the occupations at both the top and the bottom: their share of employee 
income dropped from 7.8% to 7.3%--all of the decline occurring from 1992 to 1994 
The general pattern of changes exhibited in Tables 8A and 8B show that the 
distribution of income among employees became more polarized. Occupations at the two 
extremes increased their share of total income: supervisory and professional employees at the 
top and industrial laborers and Street vendors and domestic workers at the bottom. Those 
occupations in the middle, such as industrial workers and commercial employees, lost ground. 
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Polarization of Employee Income 
The polarization of employee income follQwed a pattern very similar to that reported 
earlier for labor income. Employee income is a smaller category than labor income because 
it includes only the income received by non-agricultural employees; labor income is also 
received by groups other than employees. The standard Gim Coefficient of employee income 
rose from 0.473 in 1989 to 0.503 in 1992 and then to 0.532 in 1994--a substantial rise of 12% 
in such a short period of time (Table 9). However, the percentage increase in the polarization 
index of employee income was over twice as high, i.e. 26%. This was due to the notable 18% 
rise in skewness--from 1.55 to 1.83. The 9% increase in the relative median deviation was 
less pronounced. However, the difference between the relative median deviation (T) and the 
standard Gini coefficient (G)--which is a central component of the polarization index ((T - 
G)S)--did increase from 0.825 to 0.885 during the period 1989-1994. This difference is 
scaled up by the change in the skewness ratio to generate the difference in the polarization 
index. 
Gross Contribution to Inequality by Employee Occupation 
In Table IOA we examine the gross contribution to total inequality of each of the eight 
employee occupations. The income shares listed in the table are derived by dividing the 
monetary income of employee groups by total household income, including non-monetary as 
well as monetary income; and the inequality shares refer to the contribution of each 
occupation's income to the overall distribution of total household per capita income. 
Both technical workers and supervisory and professional employees increased their 
gross contribution to inequality between 1989 and 1994 (Table bA). Whereas the 
contribution of technical workers increased by 1.4 percentage points to 6.2%, that of 
supervisors and professionals skyrocketed by over 9 percentage points to almost 22%. 
All other employee occupations contributed less to inequality in 1994 than they did 
in 1989. Predictably, the sharpest drop in contribution was that of public workers--due 
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almost exclusively to this group's falling share of income. In 1989, the contribution to 
inequality of public workers was the largest of any employee occupation, but by 1994 this 
group's 11% contribution was well behind that of supervisors and professionals. 
The gross contribution to inequality of regular industrial workers also dropped 
markedly, from 4.3% to 3%. In 1994, this occupation's share of inequality was less than half 
its share of total household income. Its contribution to inequality dropped below that of 
commercial employees even though the latter group's share of the employee workforce was 
half that of industrial workers. 
While the share of total income received by industrial laborers and helpers rose from 
1989 to 1994, the group's share of inequality dropped. The reason is that while the 
membership in this occupation was increasing markedly, its average income level was 
declining. 
There was little change in the share of inequality accounted for by commercial 
employees, regular service workers and employed Street vendors and domestic workers. The 
income share of the latter group did rise by 40% during 1989.1994, but its share of inequality 
dropped slightly. 
Marginal Conribution to Inequality by Employee Occupation 
Table 1 OB shows the marginal contribution to total inequality from each employee 
occupation—namely, by what percentage would inequality change if the income share of each 
occupation rose by one percent. This is a relative measure since it takes the difference 
between each group's share of total inequality and its share of total income. 
Surprisingly, boosting the income of technical workers in 1994 would have had 
virtually no effect on the distribution of total income. The same would have been true with 
regard to commercial employees. 
Only in the case of two groups would boosting their income have served to 
significantly exacerbate inequality: public workers and supervisory and professional 
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employees. In the case of the former, augmenting their income share by 1% would have 
raised inequality by a little over 2%--a slightly more disequalizng effect than in 1989. 
However, raising the income share of supervisors and professionals in 1994 would have 
caused a 8.6% increase in total inequality. This was a substantial rise from this group's 
marginal contribution in 1989, which was a little over 4%. 
Among employee groups, the biggest impact on reducing inequality in 1994 would 
have come from raising the income of industrial workers: a 1% increase in this group's share 
would have lowered inequality by over 3%. This was a decline from its equalizing effect in 
both 1989 and 1992. The next-largest impact on reducing inequality would have come from 
boosting the income of industrial laborers, i.e a 2.6% drop in inequality, which was well over 
twice the effect in 1989. 
Channeling income to regular service workers and to street vendors and domestic 
workers would also have decreased inequality in 1994, but less so than for industrial 
occupations. One reason is that these occupations--especially Street vendors and domestic 
workers--accounted for a smaller share of total income. Accounting for a little over 1% of 
all income, if this latter poor group had been able to marginally increase its income share, this 
would have correspondingly lowered total inequality by 1%. Marginally augmenting the 
income share of regular service workers would have decreased inequality by only 0.8% 
despite the fact that this group had an income share 64% larger. 
V. CONCLUSION 
From 1984 to 1994, during the period of dramatic liberalization and restructuring of 
the Mexican economy, income inequality progressively increased--despite a falling share of 
profits in total income. During the early 1990s, the rising inequality of labor income was the 
single most significant contributing factor to greater inequality in the distribution of total 
household per capita income. Employee income also had a distinctly disequalizing impact. 
Our findings run counter to the common expectation, based on the well-known 
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Stolper-Samuelson theorem, that in labor-abundant developing countries the transfer of 
resources from nontradable goods to tradable goods and the predicted growth and 
employment from such economic restructuring should disproportionately benefit lower-paid, 
less-skilled industrial workers and the agricultural workforce (Krueger 1990). More recently, 
theoretical and empirical work have led researchers to entertain the possibility of opposite 
conclusions (Davis 1996 and Robbins 1996). 
In the case of Mexico, while relatively-privileged public-sector workers were 
adversely affected by restructuring, mainly through loss of jobs, most other employees in 
highly-paid, skilled positions and occupations clearly gained. The largest gains were reaped 
by employees in supervisory and professional occupations. By 1994, this group contributed 
the most, by far, of any employee occupation to total inequality. 
Polarization of labor income also intensified during this period--especially between 
skilled and unskilled workers. While regular industrial workers were losing jobs and income, 
for example, more poorly-paid industrial laborers and helpers increased their share of total 
income. The same was true in the service sector, as the share of income going to regular 
service workers dropped while that going to employed Street vendors and domestic workers 
increased. As a consequence, the polarization indices for both labor income and the smaller 
category of employee income increased more notably than the respective Gini coefficients, 
which measured inequality. 
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1975-80 1981-85 1986-93 
Averageannualgrowthof GOP 6.7 2.1 1.8 
Average annual growth of GDP per capita 4.0 -0.3 -0.4 
Share of exports in GDP (constant dollars) 5.2 12.6 16.4 
Share of wages in manufacturing value added 36.7 27.8 19.6 
(Index numbers 1980=100) 
1989 1992 1994 
Employment in manufacturing 88.8 84.0 74.2 
Wages in manufacturing (blue collar workers) 62.0 68.7 71.7 
Wages in manufacturing (white collar 75.3 96.1 106.4 
Share of workers in informal sector (2) 25.1 33.0 35.3 
Note: 1. Employment and wages in manufacturing correspond to 
manufacturing firms that employ more than 10 workers. 
2. Proportion of the urban labor force in firms that employ less than 6 workers 
in services and construction or less than 16 workers in manufacturing 
(including the owner). 
Sources: World Bank Database, 1995. UNIDO. Industrial Statistics. 1994. 
INEGI. Encuesta Industrial Mensual. Various Years. 
INEGI. Encuesta Nacional de Micronegocios, 1989, 1992. 1994. 
Table 2 
Gini and Pseudo-Gini coefficients for total income and wages 
Total Income Wages 
1984 
Income Share 100.0 46.9 
Gini & Pseudo Gini 0.4293 0.4435 
1989 
Income Share 100.0 46.6 
Gini & Pseudo Gini 0.4693 0.4298 
1992 
Income Share 100.0 45.8 
Gini & Pseudo Gini 0.4749 0.4657 
1994 
Income Share 100.0 48.0 
Gini & Pseudo Gini 0.4770 0.51 00 
Calculations are based on grouped data. 
Households are ranked by total household income 
Source: Own calculations based on INEGI-ENIGH 




















































































































































































































































































































































Total Real Income per Capita by Deciles (1994 Prices) 
% change 
Deciles 1989 1992 1994 1989-94 
240.76 239.60 244.09 1.4% 
II 434.34 421.88 434.17 -0.0% 
Ill 592.64 591.85 606.54 2.3% 
IV 761.85 762.41 790.20 3.7% 
V 954.75 958.60 997.66 4.5% 
VI 1,204.90 1,215.31 1,250.47 3.8% 
VII 1,519.68 1,552.24 1,598.63 5.2% 
VIII 1,991.34 2,053.20 2,113.26 6.1% 
IX 2,830.29 3,015.93 3,083.94 9.0% 
X 7,435.85 7,819.85 8,067.05 8.5% 
Note: Households were ranked by total income per capita. 
Quarterly income in New Pesos. 
Source: Own calculations based on INEGI-ENIGH 1989, 1992, 1994. 
Table 5 
Polarization Index for Labor Income 
Percent 
1989 1992 1994 change 
Polarization index 1.28 1.43 1.61 26% 
Gini coefficient 0.49 0.52 0.55 12% 
Skewness 1.55 1.65 1.83 18% 
Relative median deviation 1.32 1.39 1.44 9% 
Note: The above is a standard Gini Coefficient of labor income, 
different from the Pseudo-Gini Coefficient reported in Table 3. 
Alt measures are calculated on labor income. 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Polarization Index for Employee Income 
Percent 
1989 1992 1994 change 
Potarizatk,n index 1.21 1.35 1.54 27% 
Gini coefficient 0.47 0.50 0.53 12% 
Skewness 1.53 1.64 1.80 18% 
Relative median deviation 1.27 1.33 1.39 9% 
Note: 1. This is a standard Gini coefficient of employee income. 
2. All measures are calculated on employee income. 
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